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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the government has
increasingly relied upon the federal material witness statute to arrest and
detain persons with knowledge of or connections to suspected terrorists.1
Of these detentions, the arrest of Abdullah al-Kidd was one of the most
publicized in the media, primarily due to his subsequent lawsuit against
former Attorney General John Ashcroft. His case made national headlines
when the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear it.2 Although the appeal
only challenged the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision regarding

1. See 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2012) (permitting the detention of a person with
material testimony whose presence may be impracticable to secure by subpoena);
Ricardo J. Bascuas, The Unconstitutionality of “Hold Until Cleared”: Reexamining
Material Witness Detentions in the Wake of the September 11th Dragnet, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 677, 695, 702 (2005) (noting that the use of the federal material witness statute
since September 11, 2001, has been unprecedented).
2. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Hear Material Witness Case, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/21/us/politics/21witness.html
(describing the case as the only major national security case of the 2011 Supreme Court
term).
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Ashcroft’s immunity from liability, the ensuing debate centered heavily
upon the propriety of the government’s use of the federal material witness
statute to detain suspected terrorists rather than actual witnesses.
Al-Kidd’s central allegation was that Ashcroft had developed a policy to
circumvent ordinary Fourth Amendment requirements through use of the
federal material witness statute.3 The Supreme Court eventually rejected
al-Kidd’s suit on the basis that Ashcroft enjoyed immunity from liability.4
In unusual fashion, however, the Court went beyond ordinary judicial
procedure by also holding that no Fourth Amendment violation had even
occurred, despite the lack of effect of the additional holding on the outcome
of the case.5 This Comment argues that the Fourth Amendment prohibits
the pretextual use of the material witness statute to preemptively detain
criminal suspects for whom ordinary criminal arrest would be impossible.
Part II reviews the federal material witness statute and the exceptions made
in the law for special needs cases. After providing an overview of alKidd’s case against the government, it then introduces concepts of feminist
theory and dignity ethics relevant to the social impact of the Fourth
Amendment ruling against al-Kidd.6 Part III contends that the Supreme
Court should not have addressed the Fourth Amendment issues because
they were not determinative to the outcome of the case and further argues
that the material witness statute falls within the special needs search and
seizure line of case law.7 Part IV then proposes policy rationales for
prohibiting the use of the material witness statute to detain criminal
suspects based on insights from feminist theory and dignity ethics.8
Finally, Part V concludes that the Court’s holding in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd
will have negative effects on the social and legal perception of witness
3. See al-Kidd v. Ashcroft (Al-Kidd II), 580 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2009)
(reiterating al-Kidd’s allegations of misuse of the statute to arrest suspects for whom
sufficient evidence did not exist to arrest on criminal charges).
4. See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd (Al-Kidd III), 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011) (holding
Ashcroft immune as he did not violate “clearly established law”).
5. Compare id. at 2083 (defending the resolution of the Fourth Amendment claim
and finding no constitutional violation), with id. at 2087 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
judgment) (criticizing the majority opinion for resolving a novel claim that had no
effect on the outcome of the case).
6. See infra Part II (discussing the historical importance of dignity in the law and
the ethical considerations necessitated by material witness arrests).
7. See infra Part III (arguing, in part, that the reasonableness of a material witness
arrest should account for underlying programmatic purposes to prevent against
potential abuse).
8. See infra Part IV (applying feminist and ethical considerations to analyze the
implications of the pretextual use of the material witness statute on the ability of the
individual to constitute a dignified identity).
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cooperation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Material Witness Statute
The federal material witness statute permits the arrest of a person who
appears to be material in a criminal proceeding and whose presence may be
impracticable to secure at a trial or deposition.9 Material witness statutes
are meant to aid prosecutors in the gathering of important information
against a criminal, and thus allow for the arrest of an individual who is not
suspected of a crime. Despite the unique situation presented by the arrest
of individuals for the purpose of testimony, material witness arrests are
subject to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirements because
they are seizures within the meaning of the Constitution.10 Therefore, a
material witness arrest warrant must establish probable cause that the
statutory requirements are satisfied.11
Material witness arrest warrants, however, do not involve ordinary
probable cause that a person is suspected of criminal wrongdoing because
the witness is only held to secure testimony.12 The modification of the
probable cause requirement consequently changes other aspects of the
warrant and arrest procedure for material witnesses, often lowering the
burden on the government in comparison to ordinary criminal arrests. For
example, Miranda warnings are not required for an incarcerated witness.13
Additionally, the establishment of materiality requires only a representation
by a “responsible official,” such as a federal prosecutor.14
B. Opinion and History of the al-Kidd Decision
In 2006, Abdullah al-Kidd brought suit against former Attorney General

9. 18 U.S.C. § 3144 (2012).
10. See Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 942 (9th Cir. 1971) (rejecting any

distinctions separating the material witness statute from the procedural dictates of the
Fourth Amendment).
11. See id. (requiring probable cause for establishing both the materiality of the
testimony and the impracticability of securing the witness’s presence by subpoena).
12. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2086 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(emphasizing that probable cause for material witness arrest warrants differs from the
ordinary arrest warrant, which is based on suspicion that the arrestee has committed a
crime).
13. See, e.g., United States v. Anfield, 539 F.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1976).
14. See Bacon, 449 F.2d at 943 (determining that a mere statement by a
responsible official is sufficient for the statute, at least in the context of grand jury
proceedings).
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John Ashcroft and several Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agents.
He alleged, among other claims, violations of the federal material witness
statute and the Fourth Amendment.15 Al-Kidd was arrested pursuant to the
statute for allegedly being a material witness in the federal grand jury case
against Sami Omar Al-Hussayen.16 After sixteen days of confinement, alKidd was released from custody but required to limit his travel and report
regularly to a probation officer.17 Al-Kidd was never called as a witness in
any criminal proceeding.18
Al-Kidd alleged that, under a policy implemented by former Attorney
General Ashcroft, the government abused the material witness statute to
pretextually arrest him as a witness when the government actually detained
him as a terrorism suspect.19 Al-Kidd supported his claims with statements
by government officials that purported to show a programmatic intent to
use the material witness statute to preemptively detain terrorism suspects
who could not otherwise be arrested under criminal statutes.20 Al-Kidd
also provided details of alleged misrepresentations and omissions in the
warrant application used to secure his arrest.21
The Idaho District Court rejected Ashcroft’s motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that al-Kidd alleged the direct involvement of
Ashcroft in establishing a policy to misuse the material witness statute by
pretextually detaining individuals suspected of a crime.22 The district court
also rejected the motion for summary judgment by the federal agents who

15. See al-Kidd v. Gonzales (Al-Kidd I), No. CV:05-093-S-EJL, 2006 WL
5429570, at *1 (D. Idaho Sept. 27, 2006).
16. See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 952 (9th Cir. 2009).
17. See id. at 951-52 (describing the conditions of al-Kidd’s conditional release,
which limited his movement to four states and required meetings with a probation
officer for the next fifteen months).
18. See id. at 954 (noting the failure to use al-Kidd in Al-Hussayan’s trial or any
other proceeding).
19. Id. at 952.
20. See id. at 954-55 (providing quotes from al-Kidd’s complaint by government
officials, including Ashcroft, who referenced the use of material witness warrants to
aggressively combat terrorism through the apprehension of terrorism suspects).
21. See id. at 953 (detailing inaccuracies and omissions in the warrant affidavit,
including representing his $1,700 round-trip coach ticket as a $5,000 one-way first
class ticket, and failing to mention either al-Kidd’s or his family’s U.S. citizenship and
residency or al-Kidd’s previous cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI)).
22. See al-Kidd I, No. CV:05-093-S-EJL, 2006 WL 5429570, at *4 (D. Idaho Sept.
27, 2006) (noting that the alleged policy was to preventively detain and investigate
terrorism suspects for whom probable cause for criminal arrest could not be
established).
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obtained and reviewed the material witness warrant, finding that qualified
immunity would not apply to the agents based on the facts alleged by alKidd.23
Only Ashcroft appealed the district court’s denial of summary dismissal,
and the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court’s holding in large part.24 The
appellate court held Ashcroft liable for the arrest of al-Kidd, reasoning that
al-Kidd’s allegations included objective indicia that the arrest was related
to criminal investigation or detention rather than to securing witness
testimony.25 The court considered the programmatic purpose underlying
the use of the material witness statute after the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks on the basis that material witness arrests were not ordinary Fourth
Amendment seizures.26 The court reasoned that the prohibition against
inquiry into programmatic motivation only applies for arrests accompanied
by ordinary probable cause, while material witness arrests do not involve
suspicion of wrongdoing.27 The court then denied Ashcroft qualified
immunity for the alleged policy through a lengthy discussion of the ways
that the Attorney General was on notice that his programmatic use of the
statute violated the Fourth Amendment.28 Finally, the court rejected the
liability of Ashcroft for the treatment of al-Kidd during his detention,
which distinguished its holding from that of the district court.29 However,
the court did admonish the treatment of witnesses in confinement as similar
to the punishment of criminals.30
On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected all liability
for Ashcroft, finding him to possess qualified immunity because the right
allegedly violated was not clearly established.31 The Court rejected the
23. See id. at *8-9 (holding that the allegations of misrepresentation and omission
in the warrant application prevented the application of qualified immunity).
24. See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 977, 979 (finding Ashcroft liable for al-Kidd’s
arrest, but not liable for his treatment during confinement).
25. See id. at 963-64 (highlighting various investigatory aspects of al-Kidd’s
arrest, including that al-Kidd never actually testified as a witness).
26. See id. at 968.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 975-76 (detailing several instances of publicity regarding the abuse
of the material witness statute).
29. See id. at 978-79 (providing an overview of the abuse al-Kidd allegedly
suffered during his confinement, but rejecting the claim for liability as deficient).
30. See id. at 953, 977 (recognizing a governmental obligation to not treat
witnesses as criminals and describing the conditions of al-Kidd’s incarceration, which
included imprisonment in high-security units of detention facilities, multiple strip
searches, a cell that was kept lit twenty-four hours a day, and permission to leave the
cell for only one to two hours each day).
31. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2083-84 (2011).
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reasoning of the lower courts as insufficient to negate qualified immunity.32
The Court then proceeded to rule on the alleged Fourth Amendment
violation, although the resolution of this issue was not determinative to the
outcome of the decision.33 The Court recognized that special needs and
administrative search and seizure cases were exceptions to the general
prohibition on inquiry into motivating intent, but the majority determined
that these cases rested on a lack of individualized suspicion and were thus
inapplicable to al-Kidd’s circumstances.34
The Court’s reasoning on the Fourth Amendment issue rested on the
presumption that al-Kidd had conceded that individualized suspicion
existed in the warrant application.35 This presumption, however, was
contested in concurring opinions.36 Even Justice Kennedy, who joined the
majority opinion in full, felt obliged to observe that the holding did not
resolve whether the use of the material witness statute against al-Kidd was
lawful.37 Justice Kennedy also cautioned that the ordinary Fourth
Amendment warrant procedure might not be applicable to a material
witness arrest warrant because of the differences in the meaning of
suspicion.38 Concurring in the judgment, Justice Ginsburg and Justice
Sotomayor were more critical of the possible breadth of the majority’s
opinion, finding it unnecessary and unjustified.39 Justice Ginsburg also
disputed the presumption that the warrant application was based on
individualized suspicion, reasoning that “suspicion” is a term with specific

32. Id.
33. See id. at 2080 (determining the resolution of the Fourth Amendment claim to

be appropriate in ensuring that qualified immunity is not undermined by lower courts
even though the holding would have no effect on the outcome of the case).
34. See id. at 2080-82 (finding that the material witness warrant for al-Kidd
contained “individualized reasons” regarding al-Kidd’s detention).
35. See id. at 2082 (finding an admittance of individualized suspicion on the basis
that al-Kidd conceded the affidavit contained individualized reasons).
36. See, e.g., id. at 2087-88 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (addressing
several deficiencies in the warrant affidavit).
37. See id. at 2085-86 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that the majority’s
holding is limited to the legal theories presented to the Court and does not resolve the
lawfulness of the arrest).
38. See id. at 2086 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasizing that ordinary probable
cause is based on suspicion of criminality).
39. See id. at 2087-88 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (objecting to the
disposition of the Fourth Amendment claim given the omissions and
misrepresentations in the warrant application); id. at 2089-90 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in judgment) (criticizing the majority’s opinion for unnecessarily resolving
the novel Fourth Amendment claim through use of unsupported assumptions).
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legal meaning that refers to “suspicion of wrongdoing.”40
Following the disposition of the Supreme Court concerning al-Kidd’s
claims against Ashcroft, the Idaho District Court granted al-Kidd’s motion
for summary judgment against the federal agent who prepared the material
witness arrest warrant affidavit on the basis of the affidavit’s deficiencies.41
In contrast, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
agent who reviewed the warrant application.42
C. Special Needs Searches and Seizures
Administrative, or special needs, searches and seizures are those whose
primary objective programmatic purpose is not related to a general interest
in criminal law enforcement.43 Both the warrant and probable cause
requirements can be modified in administrative searches and seizures,
including those related to individualized suspicion and a reasonable belief
that a suspect is committing a crime.44 The special needs of the
government provide an exception to these requirements in various
particular contexts, with the involvement of law enforcement not being
determinative.45
Although Whren v. United States generally prohibits inquiry into
subjective motivating intent, special needs cases allow for inquiry into
40. See id. at 2088 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (stating that the legal
meaning of the term suspicion is not genuinely debatable).
41. See al-Kidd v. Gonzales (Al-Kidd IV), No. 1:05-cv-093-EJL-MHW, 2012 WL
4470776, at *3, 6 (D. Idaho Sept. 27, 2012) (holding that the agent improperly
misrepresented the truth and recklessly omitted crucial information from the affidavit).
42. See id. at *11 (finding that the reviewing agent acted reasonably because he
had no knowledge of the deficiencies).
43. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 (2001) (recognizing that
the special needs requisite to establish an administrative purpose are separate from
general law enforcement interests); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42
(2000) (prohibiting roadblocks that “primarily serve the general interest in crime
control”).
44. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987) (recognizing that
special needs may permit departure from the usual warrant and probable cause
requirements); see also Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79 n.15 (noting that special needs have
allowed for the suspension of Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause
requirements).
45. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419 (2004) (information-seeking
roadblock), Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (drunk driver
roadblocks); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (drug testing of
adults in safety-sensitive work contexts); Griffin, 483 U.S. 868 (probationers); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (national border control); South Dakota
v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (inventory searches); Camara v. Municipal Court of
the City & Cnty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (safety inspections).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol22/iss4/6

8

Kowalko: Critical Lessons of Al-Kidd: Respecting the Dignity of Material W

2014]

CRITICAL LESSONS OF AL-KIDD

955

objective programmatic purposes.46 When a search or seizure has dual
purposes, the special needs exception applies if the primary purpose is not
related to criminal law enforcement.47 This inquiry into programmatic
purpose precludes the use of an alleged administrative purpose from being
used as a pretext to avoid the usual probable cause and warrant
requirements.48 Therefore, the immediate objective of a search or seizure
cannot be a general crime control purpose but must have an actual
administrative purpose.49
A general interest in criminal law enforcement does not include all
government action that relates to crime control but only those situations
within the ordinary activity of law enforcement.50 Ordinary Fourth
Amendment searches and seizures involve ascertaining evidence of
criminal wrongdoing based on individualized suspicion, while the special
needs exception applies when the primary purpose of the intrusion goes
beyond an interest in ordinary criminal wrongdoing to an administrative
concern.51 Further, the Court has distinguished between the purpose of
uncovering criminal wrongdoing of the searched or seized person and the
purpose of eliciting information from that person to incriminate another.52
Indeed, in Illinois v. Lidster, the Court specifically determined the special
needs exception applies to seizures with the purpose of eliciting
46. Compare Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813-14 (1996) (rejecting
inquiry into subjective motivations of individual officers), with Edmond, 531 U.S. at
45-46 (allowing inquiry into programmatic purpose for searches justified by special
needs).
47. Compare Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-42 (prohibiting roadblocks for narcotic
interdiction because the primary purpose was detecting evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing), with Sitz, 496 U.S. at 469 (allowing for the seizure of vehicles at
roadblocks to check for drunk driving due to the public safety concern).
48. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85 (holding that the pretextual use of routine
medical treatment to obtain evidence for the purpose of incriminating patients violates
the Fourth Amendment); see also Whren, 517 U.S. at 811-12 (explaining that an
administrative purpose cannot be used as pretext to avoid the need for probable cause
when the purpose for the search is not administrative).
49. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83 (rejecting government invocation of the special
needs exception when the purpose of a search was primarily to generate evidence for
use by law enforcement).
50. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42 (recognizing that a high level of generality in
contextualizing the purpose of roadblocks could permit roadblocks for any conceivable
law enforcement purpose).
51. See id. at 41-42 (noting that the purpose of a narcotic interdiction roadblock is
merely to discover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing).
52. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004) (distinguishing a roadblock
designed to discover witnesses to a crime from one meant to determine whether the
occupants of a vehicle were involved in criminality).
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information from potential witnesses of a crime because the primary
purpose is not a general interest in crime control.53
D. Feminist Theory and Dignity Ethics
Supreme Court jurisprudence increasingly relies upon dignity as a basis
for decisions, with a trend of rising use since the twentieth century.54
When combined with the feminist theory insight that social context is
constitutive of the broader meaningful world, dignity within the law
becomes significant to establishing individual identity.55 To avoid
jeopardizing the realization of the self, the legal system should appreciate
the effects of the law on dignity.56
The government’s power to arrest individuals solely for witnessing a
crime permits treatment of these individuals that differs from ordinary
noncriminal citizens. Given this governmental power, courts have a
manifest obligation to consider the ethical implications of the use of the
material witness statute.57 The Supreme Court frequently invokes dignity
when analyzing claims of discrimination, where the assertion of inferiority
through differential treatment has no justifiable basis.58 Additionally, the
Court has relied upon dignity to protect the reputations of ordinary citizens
53. See id. at 424 (holding that information-seeking vehicular roadblocks are
permissible under the Fourth Amendment because the target of criminal interest is not
the vehicle’s occupant).
54. See Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV.
169, 179 (2011) (providing statistical analysis of increasing invocation of the term
dignity since 1946).
55. See Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 183, 188 (2011) (characterizing identity as dependent upon the relation
between dignity and the law); Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Fourth Amendment?:
Consent, Care, Privacy, and Social Meaning in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 9
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 4-5, 17 (2002) (describing the individual as constituted
by the relationship to society, the world, and the law).
56. See Henry, supra note 54, at 208, 246-49 (expressing the contingency of
identity on the recognition of dignity, including recognition by the state as the
embodiment of community norms); see also Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574
(2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)
(plurality opinion)) (relating personal dignity to the ability to “define one’s own
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life”).
57. See Stacey M. Studnicki, Material Witness Detention: Justice Served or
Denied?, 40 WAYNE L. REV. 1533, 1565 (1994) (characterizing material witness arrests
as an intimidating aspect of our justice system that demands the implementation of
ethical considerations).
58. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 142 (1994) (holding
that exclusions from jury selection based solely on gender are offensive to personal
dignity).
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against defamation.59 Through these decisions, the Court expresses the
centrality of dignity in the constitution of individual identity, with an
emphasis on the recognition of dignity under the law.60 Further, the Fourth
Amendment, by prohibiting unreasonable government seizures, guarantees
respect for the dignity of persons.61
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Court in al-Kidd, by Ruling on a Novel Fourth Amendment Claim
Without Consideration of the Facts, Did Not Exhibit Sufficient
Appreciation for Its Fourth Amendment Holding.
The majority opinion characterized the Fourth Amendment claim
broadly, based on presumed admissions by al-Kidd, as whether an arrest
unconstitutionally violates Fourth Amendment reasonableness when the
warrant is objectively valid but based on improper intent.62 With this broad
interpretation of the allegation, the majority was able to find the holding of
Whren v. United States controlling, and thus prohibited inquiry into the
motivating intent underlying a material witness arrest.63 The majority
bolstered its reliance on Whren by appealing to City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond to demonstrate that al-Kidd’s case was not a special needs case.
While Edmond allowed inquiry into motivating purpose, the majority
distinguished the lack of individualized suspicion in Edmond from the lack

59. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 22 (1990) (quoting
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966)) (finding that dignity protects personal
reputation from unjustified invasion).
60. See Rao, supra note 55, at 188-89 (referencing prohibitions against
discrimination and defamation to exemplify the societal and legal input into identity as
it relates to conceptions of dignity). Without the recognition of dignity in the law, the
individual loses the ability to realize that part of identity constituted by the law and the
legal system.
61. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989)
(finding that the Fourth Amendment guarantees the dignity of persons, along with their
privacy and security, against certain arbitrary acts by the government).
62. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2075, 2080, 2085 (2011) (characterizing the holding
of the Court as addressing only the effect of improper motive upon the reasonableness
of a material witness arrest).
63. See id. at 2082-83 (applying Whren to determine that the analysis of
reasonableness in material witness arrest cases prohibits consideration of alleged
pretext). In Whren, an allegedly pretextual stop of an automobile for illegal drugdealing activity was found to be constitutional because valid probable cause existed for
the stop. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811-13 (1996). The Court rejected the
use of subjective motives to invalidate a stop otherwise justifiable by probable cause.
Id. at 813-15 (noting the difficulty of analyzing subjective motives).
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of probably cause allegedly challenged by al-Kidd.64
The majority’s reliance on Edmond and Whren was dependent upon the
presumption that al-Kidd conceded a validly obtained warrant based on
individualized suspicion because the majority interpreted a lack of
individualized suspicion as essential to the special needs exception.65 The
justices who concurred in the judgment severely questioned this
presumption by the majority because they felt the facts of the case
presented serious issues surrounding the validity of the warrant.66 The
concurrences in judgment by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor
identified the Fourth Amendment issue as inextricably intertwined with the
particularities of al-Kidd’s arrest and detention, especially regarding the
deficiencies of the warrant.67 The actual facts undermined the premises
that confined the majority’s Fourth Amendment analysis. Consequently,
the justices concurring in the judgment characterized the majority’s holding
on the Fourth Amendment issue as narrow because of the limitations of the
majority’s analysis.68 If the majority had sufficiently appreciated the
factual difficulties surrounding al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment claim, then it
would have been unable to reach such a broad resolution of the issue on the
merits.

64. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2080-82 (distinguishing the lack of individualized
suspicion in Edmond from the lack of probable cause allegedly challenged by al-Kidd).
The holding in Edmond relied on the lack of individualized suspicion, while the
holding in Whren relied on its existence. The majority, after assuming al-Kidd’s
admission of valid individualized suspicion, relied on that assumption to distinguish
Edmond and follow Whren. See id. at 2082-83.
65. See id.
66. See id. at 2087-88 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (finding persuasive
reasons to question the majority’s initial presumption because of the omissions and
misrepresentations contained in the warrant affidavit). The affidavit did not inform the
issuing judge of several aspects of the case, including that al-Kidd previously
cooperated with the FBI, that al-Kidd’s parents, wife, and children all had U.S.
citizenship and residency, or the particular information al-Kidd possessed or how it was
material to a prosecution. See id. at 2087-88, 2088 n.2. The affidavit also
misrepresented al-Kidd’s $1,700 round-trip coach flight to Saudi Arabia as a $5,000
one-way first-class ticket. Id. at 2088.
67. Within the context of the Fourth Amendment question, Justice Ginsburg
addressed the deficiencies of the warrant and the treatment of al-Kidd during his
detention. See id. at 2087-89. Similarly, Justice Sotomayor criticized the majority’s
presentation of the Fourth Amendment issue as “artificial” and qualified it with
references to al-Kidd’s prolonged detention and the warrant’s deficiencies. Id. at 2090
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment).
68. See id. at 2090 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (describing the
majority’s ruling as a narrow one based on questionable premises and without
sufficient appreciation of the actual facts).
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1. The Court Did Not Need to Address the Fourth Amendment Claim
Because the Resolution of the Issue Did Not Affect the Outcome of the
Case.
Judicial convention cautions against resolving constitutional issues that
do not affect the outcome of a case.69 Courts risk unnecessarily wasting
judicial resources as well as creating precedent based on limited
interpretations of difficult constitutional questions.70 The Court in al-Kidd,
however, resolved al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment claim despite the outcome
of the case being determined by the issue of qualified immunity.71
The precedential value of the Fourth Amendment determination in alKidd remains unclear because of the inconsistency within the language of
the opinions.72 Although the majority classifies the Fourth Amendment
determination as a holding, it recognizes that the holding does not affect the
outcome of the case.73 Because all the opinions agree that the issue was not
determinative to the outcome of the case, the most appropriate
classification of its resolution would be dicta.74 Indeed, Part I of Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence, which was joined by the three justices who did not
join the majority opinion, attempts to limit the holding of the Court’s
majority to addressing only the legal theory before the Court.75
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, made particular effort in his majority
opinion to justify the departure from usual judicial convention.76 The
69. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236-37 (2009) (expressing hesitation
regarding the determination of novel constitutional claims when they are irrelevant to
the determination of the broader case).
70. See id. at 236, 238, 241 (reviewing the potential defects of judicial decisions
based on avoidable determinations).
71. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2080 (recognizing that the Fourth Amendment
question is not determinative to the case, but concluding that its resolution is required
to prevent lower courts from slowly undermining the values of qualified immunity).
72. See id. at 2080, 2085 (referring to the Fourth Amendment determination as a
holding, but one that does not affect the outcome of the case); id. at 2088 (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in judgment) (describing to the Fourth Amendment holding as a
determination on the merits, but criticizing it as improper).
73. See id. at 2080 (majority opinion) (suggesting the determination prohibits
future constitutional challenges).
74. See id. at 2087 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (classifying the issue as
novel and its resolution as unnecessary). But see id. at 2085 (majority opinion)
(presenting the Fourth Amendment determination as limiting subsequent constitutional
challenges).
75. See id. at 2085-86 (stating that the limited Fourth Amendment determination
did not resolve whether the use of the material witness statute against al-Kidd was
lawful).
76. See id. at 2080 (discussing his reasons for addressing the Fourth Amendment
violation).
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majority relied upon Pearson in granting itself the discretion to decide the
Fourth Amendment claim even though the determination of qualified
immunity resolved the case on its own.77 Despite the admitted novelty and
difficulty of the Fourth Amendment claim, the majority felt obligated to
resolve the issue and thus prevent erroneous constitutional determinations
from obtaining precedential value in lower courts.78
The opinions concurring in the judgment relied upon the passage in
Pearson to criticize the resolution of the Fourth Amendment issue, in spite
of the majority’s justifications.79 The issue was too novel and unnecessary
for a satisfactory precedential holding, especially given the serious factual
difficulties present in the case.80 However, as a result of the majority’s
asserted holding, material witnesses may now be unable to challenge their
arrest based on pretextual motivation.
2. The Court Failed to Consider the Deficiencies of the Warrant Because It
Based Its Conclusions on Presumptions Unwarranted by the Facts.
When resolving a motion to dismiss, courts must accept the factual
allegations of the nonmoving party as true.81 In al-Kidd, the majority
opinion accepts this dictate but then only provides a cursory description of
the facts alleged by al-Kidd, whose complaint was being challenged by
Ashcroft.82 When analyzing al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment claim, the
majority then entirely omits any discussion of al-Kidd’s factual allegations
against Ashcroft.83 Although the majority did not explicitly reject al77. See id. (circumventing its recognition that cautious thought is required before
resolving issues unnecessary to the outcome of the case); see also Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (permitting court discretion to resolve qualified immunity
claims by addressing both the alleged constitutional violation and the clearly
established standard, or only the latter).
78. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2080 (expressing concern about the insulation of
judgments on novel constitutional issues).
79. See, e.g., al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2087 (Ginsburg, J. concurring in judgment)
(quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236-37) (relying on Pearson to object to the majority’s
Fourth Amendment holding as unnecessary).
80. See id. at 2089-90 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (condemning the
majority’s ruling as narrow, unnecessary, and questionable, especially in light of the
alleged facts).
81. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663-64 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)) (holding that factual allegations must be
assumed true unless they are mere conclusions); see also al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2079
(stating an intention to accept the factual allegations in al-Kidd’s complaint as true).
82. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2079 (mentioning briefly Ashcroft’s alleged
policy, the apprehension of al-Kidd, and the length of al-Kidd’s confinement and
supervised release).
83. See id. at 2080-83 (failing to mention a single factual allegation, and providing
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Kidd’s allegations, its opinion ignored them and their impact on the issues.
The majority should have considered the facts of the case in its opinion to
ensure appreciation for al-Kidd’s situation and awareness of the stigma that
al-Kidd was trying to avoid.84 The failures of the warrant affidavit
deprived al-Kidd of his due process and characterized him as a possible
suspected terrorist. The majority should have included these facts, which
were support for al-Kidd’s claim against Ashcroft, and which showed the
possible abuse that material witness arrests pose.
In addition to omitting the factual allegations of al-Kidd’s complaint
from its discussion, the majority introduces its own deductions to defeat alKidd’s Fourth Amendment claim. The majority uses the presumption that
al-Kidd had conceded the warrant was suspected by individualized
suspicion to find no Fourth Amendment violation.85 The majority’s
reasoning is that al-Kidd’s acknowledgement of individualized reasons in
the warrant affidavit means al-Kidd conceded that the warrant for his arrest
was based on individualized suspicion.86 The majority thus equates
“individualized reasons” for the belief that al-Kidd was a material witness
with the existence of “individualized suspicion.”87 On the basis of this
presumption of properly individualized suspicion, the majority proceeds to
infer a validly obtained warrant, even stating in a footnote that the validity
of the warrant was the premise of al-Kidd’s argument.88 The majority
concludes its opinion by appealing to the validity of the warrant as a central
premise in its Fourth Amendment holding.89
The justices concurring in the judgment justifiably criticized the logic of
the majority’s presumptions concerning al-Kidd’s concessions in his
complaint.90 The complaint alleged that the affidavit accompanying the
warrant
application
contained
numerous
omissions
and

only that al-Kidd alleged he was detained as a suspected criminal).
84. Cf. al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2009) (stating that al-Kidd has been
unemployed due to the inability to obtain a security clearance as a result of his arrest).
85. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2083.
86. See id. at 2082.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 2083 n.3 (asserting that al-Kidd accepts the validity of the warrant by
seeking to hold Ashcroft liable for the improper motive of the material witness arrest
policy).
89. See id. at 2085 (stating that an arrest pursuant to a valid warrant cannot be
challenged on the basis of improper motive).
90. See id. at 2087-88 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (applying the factual
allegations in al-Kidd’s complaint to question the possibility of a validly obtained
warrant).
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misrepresentations.91 Further, the majority omits al-Kidd’s case against the
FBI Special Agents, which challenged the validity of the warrant and
resulted in a finding of recklessness for the affidavit errors.92 The failure of
the majority to consider these aspects of al-Kidd’s case prevented the
judicial process from considering the full context of his situation and its
effect on his identity.
The factual allegations in the complaint, along with the suit against the
Special Agents, are inconsistent with a concession that the warrant for alKidd’s arrest was validly obtained.93 The majority, however, omits these
facts from its discussion, causing a disconnect between the actual facts and
the majority’s presumptions as well as a lack of clarity concerning the
majority’s perspective.94 Although al-Kidd sought to hold Ashcroft liable
for a policy of improperly arresting terrorism suspects as material
witnesses, al-Kidd did not premise this claim on the validity of the
Instead, al-Kidd alleged that an aspect of the policy
warrant.95
implemented by Ashcroft was to arrest material witnesses even when the
requirements of the material witness statute were not met.96 Further, alKidd contended that his arrest was a direct result of this aspect of the
policy, and did so with sufficient force that the Ninth Circuit allowed this
claim to proceed against Ashcroft.97 The presumptions made by a majority
of the Supreme Court are irreconcilable in light of these factual allegations
made by al-Kidd and do not exhibit sufficient appreciation for his situation.
The justices who did not join the majority opinion questioned the initial

91. See id. (reiterating the allegations of a deficient warrant, including the
affidavit’s claim that al-Kidd was taking a $5,000 one-way first class ticket to Saudi
Arabia when he was actually taking a $1,700 round-trip coach ticket and its failure to
include the U.S. residency and citizenship of al-Kidd and his family or al-Kidd’s
previous repeated cooperation with the FBI).
92. See al-Kidd IV, No. 1:05-cv-093-EJL-MHW, 2012 WL 4470776, at *6 (D.
Idaho Sept. 27, 2012) (granting summary judgment against the FBI agent who prepared
the warrant application due to the agent’s reckless disregard for the truth).
93. Cf. al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2088-89 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment)
(arguing that the validity of the warrant is severely undermined both by the allegations
in al-Kidd’s complaint and by his continuing claims against the Special Agents).
94. See id. at 2087 (characterizing the presumptions made by the majority
regarding a validly obtained warrant as “puzzling”).
95. See id. at 2090 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (emphasizing that the
validity of the warrant was severely questioned even as al-Kidd sought to hold Ashcroft
liable for the alleged policy).
96. See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 957 (9th Cir. 2009).
97. See id. at 977 (finding the claim plausible on the basis of the allegations in alKidd’s complaint).
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presumption that al-Kidd had conceded individualized suspicion existed.98
The majority applied this presumption to deny an inquiry into the
programmatic purpose underlying the use of the material witness warrant
and reject al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment claim.99 In rejecting the unusual
status of the material witness statute in the criminal justice system, the
majority was able to situate its analysis squarely inside Whren.100
According to the majority, individualized suspicion accompanying a
warrant grants stronger protection than many cases where a warrant is not
required but inquiry into purpose is prohibited.101 However, inquiry into
programmatic purpose is the only way to directly confront pretextual
motivations and thus prevent such pretext from imposing an identity of
criminality through conflation of witnesses with criminal suspects.102
The failure of the government to establish individualized suspicion was
central to al-Kidd’s allegations against the government because al-Kidd
argued that the only individualized suspicion was of him being a criminal
suspect and not of him being a material witness.103 In making a similar
point, Justice Ginsburg contended that the majority’s use of the word
suspicion was unprecedented because it referred to suspicion only that a
person had witnessed a crime but not that the person was engaged in any
wrongdoing.104 In Illinois v. Lidster, the Court reached the same
conclusion by holding that detentions for the purpose of seeking

98. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2088 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment)
(engaging in a lengthy discussion about the particular legal meaning of “suspicion”
being limited to “suspicion of wrongdoing”).
99. See id. at 2082-83 (majority opinion) (determining that only a lack of
individualized suspicion permitted eschewing Whren’s prohibition on inquiry into
subjective motivation and that al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment claim therefore had no
basis).
100. See id. at 2082 (finding Whren’s prohibition on inquiry into subjective
motivation to be controlling after dismissing any special needs exception due to the
presumed existence of individualized suspicion).
101. See id. (appealing to cases, including Terry v. Ohio, where an objective
standard is applied to warrantless searches based on a lesser showing of reasonable
suspicion).
102. Cf. Ronald L. Carlson, Distorting Due Process for Noble Purposes: The
Emasculation of America’s Material Witness Laws, 42 GA. L. REV. 941, 957 (2008)
(asserting that the pretextual use of the material witness statute to arrest criminal
suspects blurs the necessary and important distinction between witness and criminal
suspect).
103. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2079 (describing the policy alleged by al-Kidd as
arresting suspected terrorists who were never intended to be used as actual witnesses).
104. See id. at 2088 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that all prior
decisions used the term suspicion to mean a suspicion of wrongdoing).
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information did not involve suspicion of the detained individual.105 Given
the unprecedented application of the word suspicion to apply to witnesses,
the use of the material witness statute to detain persons is unique, and the
issue of its pretextual use is novel.106 Because the majority presupposed
individualized suspicion, it was able to avoid analyzing the Fourth
Amendment claim or its effect on al-Kidd with the necessary complexity.107
3. Because al-Kidd’s Treatment Exemplifies the Excesses in the Use of the
Material Witness Statute, the Court Should Not Have Ignored the Alleged
Abuse al-Kidd Suffered While Incarcerated.
The conditions of al-Kidd’s confinement are a separate issue from alKidd’s Fourth Amendment claim, and even the Ninth Circuit rejected alKidd’s claim against Ashcroft for the abusive treatment of his
incarceration.108 The Ninth Circuit, however, also determined that the
government has an obligation to not treat detained witnesses the same as it
treats criminals who are incarcerated for punishment.109 Justice Ginsburg
lends support to the Ninth Circuit’s view, finding no legitimate basis for the
harsh conditions al-Kidd faced while confined.110 Justice Ginsburg
105. In Lidster, the Court upheld a vehicle stop at a checkpoint because the
checkpoint was to ask for the public’s help in providing information about a crime. See
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423 (2004). The information-seeking stop differed
from the invalid stop in Edmond, where the primary purpose was to “determine
whether a vehicle’s occupants were committing a crime.” Id. The Court found
individualized suspicion to be largely irrelevant in cases involving detentions of
potential witnesses. Id. at 424-25. The concurrence in part and dissent in part rejected
the analysis of the checkpoint stop’s reasonableness, questioning the degree of and
rationale for the interference with individual liberty. See id. at 428-29 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recommending remand on the issue of the
reasonableness of the checkpoint since the factual issue had not been addressed yet by
lower courts).
106. Cf. al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2087-88 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment)
(criticizing the disposition of the novel Fourth Amendment claim); see also id. at 2090
(Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (noting that the Court never previously
addressed a Fourth Amendment claim where the detained individual was not suspected
of committing any crime).
107. See id. at 2090 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (noting the various
factual difficulties that the majority avoids through its use of presumptions).
108. See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 957, 979 (9th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing alKidd’s Fourth Amendment claim from his Fifth Amendment claim against his custodial
conditions, and rejecting Ashcroft’s liability under the Fifth Amendment claim for a
failure to allege adequate facts to show personal involvement).
109. See id. at 977 (requiring the government to recognize an important distinction
between the punishment of criminals and the detention of witnesses).
110. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2089 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment)
(criticizing al-Kidd’s custodial conditions when his detainment was meant to secure his

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol22/iss4/6

18

Kowalko: Critical Lessons of Al-Kidd: Respecting the Dignity of Material W

2014]

CRITICAL LESSONS OF AL-KIDD

965

presents her concern as one related to the legality of the government’s use
of the material witness statute.111 Even if the incarceration conditions of a
material witness cannot be directly challenged by use of the Fourth
Amendment, the majority should have considered the claims to inform its
determination of whether the Fourth Amendment was applicable in its
usual sense. The conditions of incarceration—and the sense of difference
for what is appropriate for a witness compared to a criminal—emphasize
the uniqueness of the material witness statute. 112
Although al-Kidd was not arrested on suspicion of criminal activity, he
was treated in a manner that was worse than the criminals incarcerated in
the same facilities.113 During his sixteen days of incarceration, al-Kidd was
kept in the high-security units of three facilities and strip searched multiple
times.114 He was confined almost entirely to his cell, allowed out only one
to two hours a day, and, when transferred between facilities, was
handcuffed and restrained with shackles around his wrists, legs, and
waist.115 Both the Ninth Circuit and a minority of the Supreme Court
condemned the treatment of al-Kidd, and Justice Ginsburg described his
incarceration as “brutal.”116
Al-Kidd has not been the only material witness to face harsh treatment
during his period of confinement, and similar allegations of witness
mistreatment surfaced soon after the September 11, 2001 terrorist
attacks.117 For example, in September 2001, federal agents arrested Osama
Awadallah as a material witness, and he was immediately placed into
solitary confinement.118 In circumstances similar to those alleged by altestimony).
111. See id. (building on Justice Kennedy’s concurrence regarding questions
unaddressed by the majority, while emphasizing that the issue is one of the legality of
the government’s use of the material witness statute).
112. This is especially important to the negative repercussions on the arrested
witness and on that witness’s ability to constitute an identity as a non-criminal.
113. See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 953 (noting that al-Kidd’s cell was the only one
kept lit twenty-four hours a day).
114. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2089 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment)
(criticizing the conditions of al-Kidd’s confinement, which included several bodycavity inspections, as similar to criminal punishment).
115. See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 953.
116. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2089 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment)
(concluding that al-Kidd’s treatment expresses a disrespect for human dignity that must
be constrained).
117. See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 978 (noting criticisms of witness detention
practices from news outlets as early as December 2001 and later from courts).
118. See United States v. Awadallah, 202 F. Supp. 2d 55, 60-61 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(reciting the uncontested circumstances of Awadallah’s incarceration, including regular
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Kidd, the district court noted that Awadallah’s incarceration was more
restrictive than most of the criminals held in the same facilities.119 The
incarcerations of Awadallah and al-Kidd were not isolated incidents, and an
Assistant United States Attorney even expressed his frustration to the
Office of the Inspector General that the Bureau of Prisons did not
distinguish between terrorism suspects and material witnesses.120 The OIG
Report concluded that the government engaged in a policy of mistreating
material witnesses, at least of those incarcerated at the New York
Metropolitan Detention Center.121
These issues regarding incarceration of material witnesses should be
taken into account to appreciate the implications of the majority’s analysis
in al-Kidd because of the severe privacy intrusions they impose on
witnesses.122 The Ninth Circuit criticized similar treatment of witness and
criminals during confinement because of the uniqueness of the authority of
the government to detain witnesses through incarceration.123 The court
found an obligation of the government to not treat witnesses like criminals
when the government is empowered to detain those who are not suspected
of a crime.124 The potential for undermining the purpose of the statute in
obtaining witness cooperation through harsh detention treatment further
emphasizes the unique status of material witness arrests.125 These Fifth
Amendment issues cannot be directly challenged using the Fourth
Amendment, but they should inform any analysis of Fourth Amendment
claims regarding the legality of material witness detentions because they
are the direct impact of those detentions.126
strip searches and videotaping whenever he was removed from his cell).
119. See id. (distinguishing Awadallah’s treatment as a material witness from other
prisoners with respect to family visits, phone calls, and shower access).
120. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER
11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION
CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS, at
20 (2003) [hereinafter OIG REPORT] (noting an Assistant United States Attorney’s
complaint over his lack of input into the detentions of detainees).
121. See id. at 197 (determining that insufficient inspections prevented a conclusion
that a similar pattern of abuse existed at the other facility investigated).
122. Cf. al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2089 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
judgment) (implying that the majority’s disposition of the Fourth Amendment issue
avoided implementing safeguards against future witness mistreatment).
123. See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009).
124. Id.
125. Cf. al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2089 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment)
(questioning treatment that punishes witnesses when the purpose of the incarceration is
to obtain testimony).
126. See id. (explaining that the treatment of al-Kidd impacts the legality of the use
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4. The Court Should Have Considered the Alleged Policies of Ashcroft in
Reaching Its Fourth Amendment Determination Because These Policies
Were the Basis for al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment Claim.
Al-Kidd based his challenge to his arrest and detention on the specific
policies he alleged Ashcroft implemented after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks.127 These alleged policies were in response to the threat of
terrorism and were meant to enhance the government’s ability to combat
that threat.128 The majority, however, failed to discuss these policies and
did not mention the context of terrorism in its Fourth Amendment
analysis.129
Instead, the majority limited its Fourth Amendment
reasonableness analysis to exclude consideration of these central issues.130
Al-Kidd alleged that Ashcroft implemented policies after September 11,
2001, that used the material witness statute to detain terrorism suspects for
whom the government could not satisfy probable cause to arrest for
criminal activity.131 Relying on quotes from Executive Branch officials, alKidd alleged that Ashcroft’s policies violated the material witness statute
by ignoring the requirement of impracticability in securing testimony
without incarceration.132 Al-Kidd also disputed the materiality of the
detained witnesses by identifying low rates of material witnesses’
testimony in trials and a statement by a government official that admitted
that material witnesses may have no useful information.133 Al-Kidd then
applied these allegations to his own situation to show that the government
of the material witness statute).
127. See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 954 (describing al-Kidd’s allegations against
Ashcroft as premised on an asserted policy to pretextually detain terrorism suspects by
using the material witness statute for investigatory functions).
128. See id. (citing al-Kidd’s complaint that quotes Ashcroft as using the aggressive
detention of material witnesses to prevent new terrorist attacks).
129. See generally al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2079-83 (discussing only briefly the
alleged policies implemented by Ashcroft and failing to mention the word “terror” or
any of its derivations during its Fourth Amendment analysis).
130. See id. at 2083 (holding that Whren prohibits inquiry into motivating intent
underlying material witness arrests).
131. See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 954 (reciting the evidence in al-Kidd’s complaint,
including a quote by Ashcroft and an internal Department of Justice memorandum that
both suggested that the material witness statute would be used as part of aggressive
detention tactics against terrorism suspects).
132. See id. at 955 (identifying direct evidence in al-Kidd’s complaint that the
government used the material witness statute to arrest individuals for investigatory
purposes rather than to produce testimony).
133. See id. at 975 (noting that possibly half of all material witnesses were never
called to testify and that at least one government official was aware of the possibility
that material witnesses would not be useful in an investigation).
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detained him as a material witness only as a pretext for investigating
suspicions of involvement in terrorism.134
The Supreme Court, however, did not address these factual allegations,
but instead dismissed inquiry into the intent behind material witness arrests
by relying on Whren.135 The majority used al-Kidd’s presumed concession
of individualized suspicion to foreclose any inquiry into the alleged
pretextual motivation.136 In the course of its analysis, the majority did not
once mention the alleged policies, despite al-Kidd’s reliance on those
policies to challenge the validity of the warrant and the presumed existence
of individualized suspicion.137
The majority’s analysis thus foreclosed the possibility of consideration
of the central claims of al-Kidd’s complaint.138 The majority relied on
presumptions and the omission of details to resolve the case squarely under
precedent even though the facts presented a far more complex situation.139
Additionally, the failure of the Supreme Court to mention the context of
terrorism allowed for an expansive impact of the Fourth Amendment
analysis that is seemingly meant to affect all material witness arrests
without regard to the circumstances of the arrest.140 As a consequence, the
criminal stigma imposed on witnesses by pretextual arrests may be
expansive but has no redress under the Fourth Amendment.

134. See id. at 955, 963 (establishing an investigatory purpose by relying on the
circumstances of his arrest, such as interrogations unrelated to Al-Hussayen, and also
FBI Director Robert Mueller’s identification of al-Kidd’s arrest as a success in the fight
against terrorism).
135. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2080 (holding motivating intent is irrelevant for
the Fourth Amendment analysis).
136. See id. at 2082 (holding that a finding of individualized suspicion provides
sufficient protection to avoid going beyond an analysis of objective reasonableness).
137. Compare id. at 2080-83 (dismissing al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment claim while
not mentioning Ashcroft’s alleged policies), with id. at 2090 (Sotomayor, J., concurring
in judgment) (criticizing the majority’s presumptions and determining that the
pretextual use of the material witness statute is a difficult question).
138. See id. at 2090 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (criticizing the
majority for using presumptions to avoid factual difficulties).
139. See id. at 2082 (majority opinion) (relying on Whren to dismiss al-Kidd’s
claim). But see id. at 2090 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment) (finding the issue
to be novel and difficult but its presentation by the majority to have been artificial).
140. See id. at 2083 (majority opinion) (applying the Fourth Amendment analysis
broadly to all arrests pursuant to the material witness statute).
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B. Material Witness Arrests Should Be Considered Special Needs Seizures
Because Their Unusual and Less Protected Legal Status Demands that
Impermissible Programmatic Purposes Be Prohibited.
Material witness arrests are special needs seizures because they go
beyond the ordinary needs of criminal law enforcement.141 Although a
seizure may be incidentally related to a general interest in crime control,
the primary purpose must go beyond the ordinary enterprise of
investigating crimes.142 Seizures that are meant to procure witness
testimony are not within the ordinary needs of criminal law enforcement
because their investigatory intent is not directed at the person seized.143 By
application of the special needs exception, material witnesses can avoid
pretextual arrests and the resultant stigma of criminality.
1. The Unique Incarceration of Persons Based Solely on Their Witness to a
Crime Converts Material Witness Arrests into Special Needs Seizures.
Material witness arrests, like the seizures of witnesses in other contexts,
do not involve suspicion that the detained individual committed or is
committing a crime.144 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit relied on the distinction
between seizures of criminal suspects and seizures of witnesses to find the
arrest of al-Kidd unconstitutional.145 The concurring justices on the
Supreme Court agreed that warrants obtained under the material witness
statute were unique because they did not rely upon probable cause that the
individual had committed a crime.146 The majority’s analysis is therefore
141. Cf. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83 (2001) (prohibiting special
needs exceptions when the primary objective governmental purpose is to generate
evidence for use by law enforcement).
142. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 43-44 (2000) (prohibiting
checkpoints to search for evidence of narcotics, although recognizing that the
immediate hazard to public safety allows for checkpoints designed to stop drunk
drivers).
143. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 428 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (recognizing the significant distinction between targeting an
individual for suspicion of a crime and targeting an individual for information about a
crime committed by another).
144. Cf. id. at 424 (majority opinion) (holding that seizures meant to seek
information about a crime not performed by the seized person go beyond the ordinary
needs of law enforcement).
145. See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 969-70 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the
pretextual use of the material witness statute to investigate suspects without a showing
of probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment).
146. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2086 (2011) (Stevens, J., concurring) (finding
that the standard for obtaining material witness arrest warrants is atypical because
witnesses are not criminal suspects).
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flawed because it does not recognize its reliance on a reinterpretation of the
word “suspicion” that allows it to ignore the unusual status of a material
witness arrest as not dependent upon ordinary probable cause.147
The majority in al-Kidd relied upon three erroneous assumptions to
determine that the special needs exception does not apply to material
witness arrests. First, the majority interpreted Edmond as approving
checkpoints for general crime control purposes that were based upon
merely some quantum of individualized suspicion.148 Second, the majority
broadly interpreted the term “suspicion” to go beyond suspicion that an
individual has committed or is committing a crime.149 Finally, the majority
presumed that al-Kidd conceded the existence of individualized suspicion
and thus precluded himself from challenging pretextual use of the material
witness statute.150
The foundational premise of the majority’s argument, that some quantum
of individualized suspicion will sufficiently justify a seizure to prevent
inquiry into motivating intent, is a misinterpretation of the analysis in
Edmond.151 The majority asserted that the Court in Edmond would approve
checkpoint stops based upon any amount of individualized suspicion even
though the purpose was a general interest in crime control.152 The majority
then erroneously concludes that the lack of a general seizure scheme
undertaken without individualized suspicion prohibits the consideration of
programmatic purposes.153 However, the Court in Edmond only expressed
that such a conclusion may be permissible and not that a prohibition on
programmatic purpose was certain.154 Al-Kidd’s majority therefore
147. See id. at 2081 (majority opinion) (relying on Edmond’s approval of
checkpoints for general crime control purposes that are based on individualized
suspicion to reject inquiry into motivating intent).
148. See id. (ignoring the context of a statement made in Edmond and introducing
the word “merely” to change its meaning).
149. See id. at 2082 n.2 (arguing that the term “suspicion” must be understood to
have a common and idiomatic meaning, rather than a particular legal one).
150. See id. at 2083 (holding that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred because
the arrest was objectively justified).
151. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47 (2000) (holding that the
constitutionality of a checkpoint scheme depends on the balancing of competing
interests).
152. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2081 (interpreting Edmond as making a
determinate holding regarding a hypothetical situation that was not before the Court in
Edmond).
153. See id. at 2082 (concluding that the existence of individualized suspicion
prohibits an analysis under the special needs exception).
154. Compare id. at 2081 (“Edmond explicitly said that it would approve
checkpoint stops for ‘general crime control purposes’ that were based upon merely
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interprets Edmond’s permissive attitude towards consideration of
programmatic purpose in analyzing Fourth Amendment seizures to be an
absolute one that permits this consideration only when the seizure is
undertaken without generalized suspicion.155 The majority’s approach
modifies Edmond by inferring an “only” in a sentence, which effectively
distorts the actual holding.156 Individualized suspicion may justify a
seizure sufficiently to prohibit inquiry into individualized suspicion, but
that does not mean that any quantum of individualized suspicion will
inevitably justify such a seizure.157
The majority proceeds to use this interpretation of Edmond as the basis
upon which its interpretation of the term “suspicion” and of al-Kidd’s
complaint prohibit an inquiry into the alleged policies implemented by
Ashcroft.158 These latter two interpretations are intertwined because the
majority asserts that the term “suspicion” includes suspicion that one is a
witness in a criminal investigation and then infers that al-Kidd conceded
that such suspicion must exist.159 Justice Ginsburg, however, disputes that
the use of the term “suspicion” in legal discourse has the same meaning as
its use in common parlance.160 Further, Justice Ginsburg questions the
validity of the warrant on the basis that the individualized reasons provided
in the affidavit accompanying the warrant application were undermined by
omissions and misrepresentations.161 Without these assumptions by the
‘some quantum of individualized suspicion.’”), with Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47 (“When
law enforcement authorities pursue primarily general crime control purposes at
checkpoints . . . stops can only be justified by some quantum of individualized
suspicion.”).
155. See id. at 2081 (effectively interpreting the statement in Edmond that purpose
“may be relevant” when a seizure is without individualized suspicion to mean that
purpose may be relevant only in such a situation).
156. Cf. id. at 2083 (criticizing al-Kidd for making this same error in his
interpretation of Whren).
157. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 457 (asserting that individualized suspicion is
required but not necessarily sufficient to justify a checkpoint based on primarily
general crime control purposes).
158. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2082-83 (applying the presumed existence of
individualized suspicion to reject consideration of the allegedly pretextual use of the
material witness statute).
159. See id. at 2082 (inferring al-Kidd’s concession of individualized suspicion
from the fact that the warrant application gave individualized reasons to believe alKidd was a material witness).
160. See id. at 2088 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment) (providing extensive
case law to show that the phrase “individualized suspicion” has been exclusively used
to refer to suspicion of wrongdoing).
161. See id. (debating the assumption of a valid material witness warrant as well as
the propriety of a merits determination).
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majority, strong cause exists to believe that the material witness statute
should undergo analysis under the special needs exception.162
Based on the rationale of Lidster, the seizure of witnesses using the
material witness statute should be considered a special needs exception.163
Witness detentions differ greatly from the situation in Edmond, where the
Court held unconstitutional the suspicionless detention of individuals for
drug possession because the seizures did not satisfy any special needs
exception.164 Although material witness arrests do not involve suspicion of
a crime, these detentions should be permitted as exceptions to the general
dictates of the Fourth Amendment and allowed to advance important law
enforcement objectives.165 In Lidster, the Court recognized the importance
of witness detentions in certain circumstances, and thus applied the special
needs doctrine to allow for this unusual situation, where information is
collected through cooperation with noncriminal citizens.166 Similarly, the
Court in al-Kidd should have recognized the distinctive aspects of material
witness arrests, and permitted them only as pursuant to the special needs
exception.167
The appropriateness of the application of the special needs exception to
the material witness statute is evident through the uniqueness and rarity of
its occurrence in law enforcement activity.168 Instead of stopping an
individual for suspicion of a crime, the person is being detained for having
information about a crime.169 Lower courts have thus rightly recognized
162. Cf. al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 966-70 (9th Cir. 2009) (using the unusual status
of material witness arrests to justify the application of the special needs exception and
conclude that a Fourth Amendment violation had occurred).
163. Cf. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423-25 (2004) (applying special needs
analysis to detentions that have the purpose of obtaining information from witnesses as
opposed to the purpose of incriminating the detained individual); see also supra note
106 and accompanying text.
164. See id. at 423 (distinguishing stops to obtain information from potential
witnesses to a crime from the general interest in crime control found in Edmond).
165. See id. at 427 (applying the special needs exception to motorist checkpoints
because of the importance of the information-seeking activity).
166. See id. at 424 (recognizing that information-seeking stops differ from law
enforcement’s ordinary interest in crime control, which targets criminal suspects for
investigation).
167. Cf. al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2086 (2011) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting
the atypical aspects of warrants and arrests under the material witness statute).
168. See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 966 n.16 (9th Cir. 2009) (observing that only
3.6% of federal arrests are pursuant to the material witness statute, and only 0.3% of
federal arrests outside the context of immigration are pursuant to the statute).
169. See id. at 969 (recognizing the distinction between a witness and a criminal as
central to analysis of material witnesses and thus permitting inquiry into programmatic
intent).
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the important distinction between detention of criminals and detention of
material witnesses.170 Additionally, all four concurring justices on the
Supreme Court agreed that material witness arrests are so unusual that they
may not be covered by the Warrant Clause.171 The inapplicability of the
Warrant Clause is a key aspect of special needs cases, as they often do not
involve individualized suspicion.172 Without the element of criminality,
and the corresponding requirement of probable cause for suspicion of a
crime, the detention of witnesses is most adequately covered in our judicial
system by application of the special needs exception.173 The special needs
exception would then distinguish material witness arrests from ordinary
criminal arrests and help allay the imputation of criminality.
2. The Programmatic Purpose Behind Material Witness Arrests Must Be
Considered to Prevent Abuse of the Statute Because the Statute Is
Particularly Vulnerable Given Its Special Needs.
The material witness statute is vulnerable to abuse because it does not
involve the ordinary suspicion of criminal activity that characterizes most
law enforcement activity.174 The requirement of probable cause in the
material witness statute does not afford the same protections as the
requirement of probable cause for arrest of criminal suspects.175 Because
ordinary probable cause already includes individualized suspicion of
criminal involvement, an arrest warrant adequately based on ordinary
probable cause could not, by definition, be used to pretextually arrest an
individual for whom no ordinary probable cause to arrest existed.
Conversely, the nature of the material witness statute, which is precisely
meant to avoid the requirement of probable cause for suspicion of criminal
170. See id. at 977 (admonishing the treatment of incarcerated witnesses as similar
to the punishment of criminals through incarceration).
171. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2086 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that
material arrest warrants are not issued on the basis of probable cause that the arrestee
committed a crime).
172. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004) (comparing the permissible
information-seeking stop to other special needs cases that did not involve
individualized suspicion).
173. See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 970 (allowing for consideration of programmatic
purpose in material witness arrests due to the distinctive lack of probable cause for
suspicion of criminal activity).
174. See id. (noting the inapplicability of ordinary probable cause to material
witness arrests and warrants and recognizing a resultant susceptibility to pretextual
use).
175. See id. at 968 (finding that probable cause to arrest material witnesses has
similar procedural protections to ordinary probable cause, but that it still does not
satisfy the probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment).
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activity, allows for the potential pretextual use to arrest criminal suspects
for whom ordinary probable cause does not exist because the government
has less to show.176 Additionally, the means of satisfying the probable
cause requirements for a material witness arrest can be substantially easier
to satisfy.177 Given these distinctive aspects regarding material witness
arrests, consideration of programmatic purposes would allow for an inquiry
into the heightened possibility of misuse.178
A prohibition on inquiry into programmatic purpose behind the use of
the material witness statute makes the statute vulnerable to misuse.179 As
the majority in al-Kidd admits, seizures unaccompanied by suspicion of
wrongdoing are a rare occurrence and thus are frequently unaddressed by
courts.180 The lack of judicial precedent further compounds the difficulties
inherent in determining the practicality of securing witness testimony by
subpoena or deposition.181 Further compounding the problem is the lack of
judicial supervision required for the issuance of subpoenas.182 As a
consequence of these difficulties, judges rarely, if ever, deny a request for a
material witness warrant when related to the context of terrorism.183
Therefore, inquiry into the programmatic purpose behind material witness
arrests is necessary to protect the Fourth Amendment and prevent abuse of
the material witness statute.
176. See id. at 970 (observing the vulnerability of the material witness statute to
pretextual use to arrest criminal suspects for whom ordinary probable cause does not
exist).
177. See Bacon v. United States, 440 F.2d 933, 943 (1971) (holding that, for grand
jury proceedings, the mere assertion by a federal prosecutor will satisfy the probable
cause requirement for the materiality of the witness).
178. See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 968-70 (rejecting Whren’s prohibition on inquiry
into programmatic purpose because of the lack of ordinary probable cause in material
witness arrests and the potential for misuse).
179. See Kit Kinports, Camreta and al-Kidd: The Supreme Court, the Fourth
Amendment, and Witnesses, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 283, 288 (2012) (noting
the possibility for recurring instances of abuse due to the lack of judicial oversight).
180. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2082 n.2 (commenting on the lack of case law
using the word “suspicion” without meaning suspicion of wrongdoing).
181. Cf. id. at 2086 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (expressing concern about the
uncertain scope of the statute’s lawful use).
182. Wesley MacNeil Oliver, Material Witness Detentions After al-Kidd, 100 KY.
L.J. 293, 322 (2012) (asserting that the goal of material witness arrests is unrelated to
ordinary law enforcement because of the manner that subpoenas are issued).
183. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WITNESS TO ABUSE: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
UNDER THE MATERIAL WITNESS LAW SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, at 45 (2005), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/us0605/us0605.pdf (finding no instances of a court
denying a government application for a material witness warrant in connection with
September 11, 2001).
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Consideration of the programmatic purpose behind the arrest of al-Kidd,
based on the allegations contained in al-Kidd’s complaint, would result in a
finding that al-Kidd’s arrest was improper.184 The government may not use
the material witness statute to avoid the Fourth Amendment requirements
of probable cause for the arrest of criminal suspects.185 Al-Kidd’s
complaint presented numerous instances of statements by government
officials that the material witness statute was being used to arrest suspected
terrorists for whom ordinary probable cause could not be established,
including statements about al-Kidd specifically.186 Pretextual use of the
material witness statute goes beyond its limited use under the special needs
exception because this use serves the ordinary needs of law enforcement
instead of the distinctive purpose of securing witness testimony.187
Consequently, although al-Kidd’s claim against Ashcroft was barred due to
qualified immunity, the policy implemented by Ashcroft and the
subsequent arrest of al-Kidd pursuant to that policy were
unconstitutional.188
IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Justice Should Require Consideration of How Social Meaning,
Especially Stigma, Affects the Dignity of Material Witnesses.
Dignity is dependent upon respect within one’s community, and
especially respect for one’s self-determination of individual identity.189
The actions of the state and the perceptions of society are intimately
intertwined with the expression of dignity because identity is a concrete
notion constituted by a particular historical context.190 The attitude of
184. See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the pretextual
use of the material witness statute to arrest criminal suspects violates the Fourth
Amendment).
185. See United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 59 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting in dicta
that the government cannot use the material witness statute to arrest suspected
criminals for whom probable cause cannot be established).
186. See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 963-64 (summarizing the allegations made by alKidd and concluding that, if true, they were objective indicia of an impermissible
investigative or preemptive detention).
187. See id. at 969 (holding that the use of the material witness statute for a criminal
investigatory purpose violates the Fourth Amendment).
188. Cf. al-Kidd III, 131 S Ct. 2074, 2090 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in
judgment) (stating that the Court did not decide whether the pretextual use of the
material witness statute was lawful, but only that Ashcroft was qualifiedly immune).
189. See Rao, supra note 55, at 188 (arguing for an understanding of dignity as
based on the expression of one’s self-identity).
190. See Taslitz, supra note 55, at 17 (utilizing consent to argue for a conception of
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one’s community, which importantly includes the attitudes of the state as
expressed by the law, thus has a vital role in the constitution of selfidentity.191 The law takes part in the constitution of the self. Given the
broad and various ways that the law affects and takes part in our lives, the
law can be seen as a significant aspect of who one is. If social meaning,
therefore—and the contributions to it by the law—are central to
establishing a dignified identity, then justice demands its consideration in
judicial analysis.192
Material witnesses are especially vulnerable to the imputation of
negative social meaning because of their unusual treatment in the legal
system.193 While arrest and incarceration can be stigmatizing on its own,
arrest and incarceration with the implication that one is involved in
criminality is far more stigmatizing, and thus damaging to personal agency
in creating one’s own sense of identity. The feminist concern with the
effect of social meaning on the constitution of identity can help address
limited consideration of the social context of judicial processes.194
Feminism has been used to explore the impacts of social meaning on
women by relying on critical factual inquiry and the discovery and
rejection of unsupported presuppositions. This same critical perspective
can provide a more appreciative analysis of the impact of Fourth
Amendment analysis on material witnesses.195
The increasing use of dignity in Supreme Court decisions can be seen as
a signal of the consideration of social meaning in legal analysis.196 In
particular, the Court has shown an implicit concern with stigmatizing social
meaning when dealing with Fourth Amendment analysis.197 Justifications
the self that is shaped by society and the state).
191. See Rao, supra note 55, at 188 (relying on defamation and hate speech laws to
argue for the respect required for expression of dignity).
192. See Taslitz, supra note 55, at 79 (concluding that a social meaning inquiry
improves reasonableness balancing in Fourth Amendment analysis and helps ensure
justice).
193. See Oliver, supra note 182, at 316 (providing historical background of public
and statutory approval of detaining criminal suspects as material witnesses).
194. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829,
837 (1990) (utilizing feminist theory to question the impact on women of not
considering gender implications in apparently neutral practices).
195. Cf. Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423 (2004) (relying on the distinctiveness
of witness questioning to distinguish an information-seeking checkpoint from other
checkpoints).
196. Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (using
dignity as a constitutive aspect of meaning to uphold a woman’s right to choose
whether to terminate a pregnancy).
197. See Taslitz, supra note 55, at 77 (arguing that the stigma attached to drug-
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based on unwarranted stigma certainly have a basis in Supreme Court
precedent in contexts such as racial discrimination.198 These concerns
about social meaning should be considered in Fourth Amendment analysis
of material witness arrests because the dignity of witnesses is at risk when
the stigma of criminality is imparted to the mere status of being a witness
to a crime.199
B. Arrests of Material Witnesses Should Be Considered Special Needs
Exceptions, Rather Than Satisfying the Ordinary Needs of Criminal Law
Enforcement, to Avoid Stigmatization of Witnesses as Criminals.
The judicial treatment of material witnesses like criminals contains the
threat of conflating the status of being a witness with being involved in
criminality.200 The decision of the Court in al-Kidd undermined a crucial
avenue for avoiding the stigmatization of material witnesses by removing
the possibility for inquiry into pretextual use of the material witness statute
to detain suspects as witnesses.201 Pursuant to the majority’s dicta that
excluded special needs analysis of material witness arrests, the government
would be permitted to detain criminal suspects by arresting them as
witnesses.202 The arrest of individuals with no means to distinguish
between those arrested for merely being witnesses and those arrested for
being criminal suspects would reinforce the popular negative attitude
against all those who are arrested.203
Material witness arrests should be analyzed under the special needs
exception because the stigma of criminality should not be imparted to the
using mothers explains the difference in outcomes between Ferguson and Edmond).
198. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (holding separate
educational facilities to be unconstitutional because of the feeling of inferiority
imparted on black students).
199. Cf. Studnicki, supra note 57, at 1565 (arguing for the importance of ethical
considerations in the context of material witnesses due to the distinctive use of
government power to arrest those who are not suspected of criminal activity).
200. See Carlson, supra note 102, at 972 (urging a strong judicial declaration
separating the statuses of witness and defendant).
201. Cf. Taslitz, supra note 55, at 30 (arguing that government objectives that are
less stigmatizing should be considered under the special needs exception).
202. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2075, 2083 (2011) (asserting that the pretextual use
of the material witness statute does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
203. See Oliver, supra note 182, at 317 (finding that the public was historically
most tolerant of the use of material witness statutes to pretextually arrest criminal
suspects). The point in this Article is that the historical tolerance of the pretextual use
of material witness statutes and the legacy of that perception need to be challenged to
validate the use of material witness arrests as respective of individual liberty and
dignity.
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status of being a witness.204 By rejecting a special needs analysis, the
majority effectively asserted that material witness arrests are part of the
ordinary needs of law enforcement.205 However, material witness arrests
do not have a general law enforcement purpose but rather serve the
distinctive special need of securing witness testimony.206 The majority
ignored the unusual status of material witnesses by situating its analysis
within the context of Whren’s prohibition on inquiry into programmatic
purposes.207 Appreciation of the uniqueness of material witness arrests
under the special needs doctrine would allow for a more sufficient
consideration of the factual allegations concerning the programmatic
purpose underlying al-Kidd’s arrest.208 With consideration of the alleged
policy implemented by Ashcroft, the stigma of criminality imparted to
material witnesses such as al-Kidd could be avoided, at least in significant
part, because criminal suspects could not be pretextually detained as
material witnesses, and especially not as part of an official policy.
In a larger context, the application of feminist theory suggests that a
purpose that stigmatizes the target of a seizure should be considered a
criminal law enforcement purpose.209 If the Supreme Court explicitly
embraced such an understanding, then law enforcement officers would be
incentivized to avoid stigmatizing material witnesses through pretextual
policies.210 Combining this incentive for law enforcement with judicial
precedent that respects the dignity of witnesses to constitute their own
identity separate from criminality would allow the application of the
special needs exception to uphold the important status of being a witness.
204. Cf. Taslitz, supra note 55, at 77 (arguing that the social stigma attached to
drug-abusing pregnant women most appropriately identifies the search for drug abuse
evidence as a criminal matter instead of an administrative one).
205. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79 (2001) (identifying the
distinguishing factor of special needs cases as going beyond a general interest in crime
control).
206. See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2088 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in judgment)
(showing the unusual use of the word “suspicion” when applied to material witnesses
since witnesses are not suspected of a crime but rather supply testimony).
207. See id. at 2082 (majority opinion) (relying on a presumption of individualized
suspicion to reject the application of special needs analysis).
208. Cf. id. at 2083 (rejecting inquiry into the alleged programmatic purposes
because of the reliance on Whren).
209. See Taslitz, supra note 55, at 30 (positing that social meaning is the most
significant factor in determining whether the primary objective purpose of a search or
seizure is ordinary criminal law enforcement or administrative).
210. See id. at 37 (arguing that the Court implicitly embraced the importance of
social meaning and stigmatization in distinguishing Ferguson from similar earlier
cases).
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V. CONCLUSION
The unprecedented use of the material witness statute to preemptively
detain terrorism suspects for whom ordinary probable cause to arrest
cannot be established demands judicial action that distinguishes mere
witnesses from criminal defendants.211 Analysis under the special needs
exception allows for this legal distinction because the consideration of
programmatic purpose would prohibit the pretextual use of the material
witness statute to arrest criminal suspects as an official policy.212 The
majority in al-Kidd, however, did not exhibit sufficient appreciation for
either the allegations made by al-Kidd or the unique status of the material
witness statute and thus failed to reach the appropriate conclusion
regarding the allegations of pretext. As a result, the stigma of criminality
may be easily imparted upon mere witnesses without redress because an
inquiry into misuse of the material witness statute is prohibited.
The majority’s failure in al-Kidd to consider the alleged pretextual use of
the material witness statute was not only misguided on the basis of
precedent, but the possible import of stigma on witnesses undermines the
important value placed on witness cooperation. The special needs line of
cases provides precisely the necessary analysis to effectively distinguish
between a witness and a criminal suspect by allowing for consideration of
programmatic purpose underlying a scheme of arrests. With the threat of
imparting unwarranted stigma onto material witnesses, justice requires that
a deeper inquiry into underlying motivations be permitted for material
witness arrests.

211. See Carlson, supra note 102, at 972 (urging a vigorous distinction by the
federal judiciary between criminal suspects and material witnesses).
212. See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying the special
needs exception to find a violation of the Fourth Amendment in Ashcroft’s alleged
policy of pretextually using the material witness statute).
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